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RESOLVING DISPUTES OVER FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT OF
ATHLETES: ENGLISH AND AMERICAN EXPERIENCES
JAMES A.R. NAFZIGER*
This symposium on legal aspects of the Olympic Games high-
lights the growing importance of international sports law. Union
Royale Belge des Societes de Football Association ASBL & Ors v. Bosman, I
recently decided by the European Court of Justice, is another re-
minder of the critical relationship between international legal insti-
tutions and the sports arena. Bosman also highlights issues related
to the freedom of athletes and their management by sports associa-
tions.2 Although international sports law has been developing rap-
idly in Europe as a professional and academic topic, we in the
United States have been rather slow off the starting blocks in recog-
nizing the emerging body of law. This symposium is therefore an
idea whose time has certainly come.
The role of sports associations in the financial management of
athletes raises significant legal issues. These issues relate to spon-
sorship of athletes, labor contracts, eligibility for competition, the
role of broadcasting contracts and management of revenue earned
by non-professionals. In particular, the growing dominance of
broadcasting interests and commercial sponsorship in the sports
arena has generated controversy.
* Thomas B. Stoel Professor of Law, Willamette University College of Law;
Vice President, International Association of Sports Law (IA.S.L.). This essay is
based upon the texts of the author's remarks at the Fourth Congress of the IA.S.L.
(Nov. 10, 1995) and at the Annual Meeting of the Association of American Law
Schools (Jan. 6, 1996).
1. (Case C-415/93) [1995] 1 CEC 38. In Bosman, the European Court ofJus-
tice struck down rules of the Union of European Football Association for interna-
tional transfers of football players and nationality restrictions that had imposed a
three-player limit on teams engaged in inter-club matches within the member
states of the European Union. The decision, based on interpretations of the
Treaty of Rome, extends to players and competition in both the European Union
and the European Economic Area. Bosman builds upon decisions of the European
Court ofJustice that struck down a limited range of nationality restrictions as viola-
tions of the Treaty of Rome. Id. at 69-71. The two principal cases are Walrave v.
Union Cycliste Internationale, Case 36/74, 1974 E.C.R. 1405, and Dond v. Mantero,
Case 13/76, 1976 E.C.R. 1333. For discussion of these issues, see GEORGE A. BER-
MANN ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW 513 (1993);Jac-
ques Rogge, The Olympic Movement and the European Union, OLYMPic REv., Oct.-Nov.
1995, at 44.
2. See generally Bosman, (Case C-415/93) [1995] 1 CEC at 53-118.
(413)
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In recent years the International Olympic Committee (IOC)
has devoted more and more attention to raising funds to support its
ambitious agenda of activities. Consequently, the IOC has become
a leader in a trend toward commercializing sports. The IOC's com-
mercial activities include broadcasting contracts, 3 The Olympic Pro-
gramme (TOP) sponsorships 4 and the work of the New Sources of
Finance Commission, which seeks "to increase Olympic marketing
revenues and balance the resources of the Olympic Movement so
that it is not entirely dependent on television rights."5
The Olympic Movement plays a central role in the interna-
tional sports arena.6 It is thus not surprising that the IOC and its
National Olympic Committees (NOCs) are routinely involved in
commercial disputes. The issues often in dispute include trade-
mark rights, television proprietorship issues, news access, event and
program sponsorship, ambush or parasitic marketing, anti-trust and
competition law and eligibility issues. 7
3. The price of exclusive rights to televise the Olympic Games within a single
country or region has risen dramatically. Recently, for example, the National
Broadcasting Company (NBC) successfully bid a record $1.27 billion for exclusive
rights in the United States to broadcast the 2000 Summer Olympics in Sydney,
Australia and the 2002 Winter Games in Salt Lake City, Utah. Richard Sandomir,
For $1.27 Billion, NBCAccomplishes An Olympic Sweep, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 1995, at Al.
According to IOC rules, this fee will be divided by the IOC, the national Olympic
committees and the local organizing committees. Id. See Broadcast Olympics: Lil-
lehammer Success, OLYMPIC REv., Dec. 1994, at 587; Sports Eurovision, OLYMPiC REv.,
Sept. 1994, at 354. For discussion of Eurosport, see Stephen Townley, Some Current
International Issues on Rights to Sporting Events and Trademarks, SPORTS LAw., July-Aug.
1994, at 6.
4. See generally, Working Toward Greater Independence, OLYMPIc REv., Jan.-Feb.
1994, at 36.
5. Denis Echard, 104th Session: Work Accomplished, OLYMPIC REv., Aug.-Sept.
1995, at 7, 9.
6. See Edward E. Hollis, III, The United States Olympic Committee and the Suspen-
sion of Athletes: Reforming Grievance Procedures Under the Amateur Sports Act of 1978, 71
IND. L.J. 183 (1995). "The Olympic Movement includes the IOC, International
Federations (IFs), National Olympic Committees (NOCs), the organizing commit-
tee for a particular four-year olympiad, and the Olympic Congress." Id. at 184
(quotingJAMEs A.R. NAFZIGER, INTERNATIONAL SPORTS LAw 25-26 (1988)). See also
DavidJ. Ettinger, Comment, The Legal Status of the International Olympic Committee, 4
PACE Y.B. INT'L L. 97, 99 (1992) (explaining leadership role of IOC in Olympic
Movement); Marcia B. Nelson, Stuck Between Interlocking Rings: Efforts to Resolve the
Conflicting Demands Placed on Olympic National Governing Bodies, 26 VAND. J. TRANS-
NAT'L L. 895, 899-900 (1993) (describing interaction of Olympic Movement, IOC,
and NOCs); Jill J. Newman, The Race Does Not Always Go to the Stronger or Faster Man
• . . But to the One Who Goes to Court! An Examination of Reynolds v. International
Amateur Athletic Fed'n et al., 1 SPORTS L.J. 205, 207 (1994) (outlining roles of
numerous organizations governing amateur athletic competition).
7. See Townley, supra note 3. For a discussion of ambush or parasitic market-
ing, see Robert N. Davis, Ambushing the Olympic Games, 3 Vl. SPORTS & ENT. L.J.
423 (1996); Stephen M. McKelvey, Atlanta '96: Olympic Countdown to Ambush Arma-
geddon?, 4 SETON HALLJ. SPoRTs L. 397 (1994).
[Vol. III: p. 413
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Within the Olympic Movement, individual athletes confront in-
ternational federations (IFs) and national sports organizations with
similar issues. As these groups have grown and become more
professionalized, 8 their programs and daily management have be-
come more commercialized and complicated. For example, the
United States Figure Skating Association has struggled to reconcile
its need for broadcasting revenue with the interests of individual
athletes. Recently several figure skaters challenged a decision by
the executives of their national federation to enter into a broadcast-
ing contract that required a rescheduling of events to the detriment
of the skaters.9
In resolving such disputes between athletes and sports associa-
tions, arbitration plays a particularly important role.10 Under the
umbrella of the International Council of Arbitration for Sport
(ICAS), nearly all IFs now require mandatory arbitration clauses in
licensing contracts between athletes and national sports organiza-
tions.1 Athletes must enter into these contracts in order to be eli-
gible to participate in international competition sanctioned by the
IFs. Therefore, the arbitration clauses in the contracts provide the
basis for enforcing arbitration awards against individual athletes,
even when their future livelihood may be at issue. Mandatory arbi-
tration of disputes will be a feature of the Games beginning in
1996.12
8. See Philip Hersch, US. Figure Skating Head Made Waves, CHI. TRIB., May 18,
1995, at 3. For a discussion of characteristics and trends in the organizational
structure of international athletics, see David B. Mack, Note, Reynolds v. Interna-
tional Amateur Athletic Federation: The Need for an Independent Tribunal in Interna-
tional Athletic Disputes, 10 CONN. J. INT'L L., 653 (1995); Michael R. Will, Les
structures du sport internationa4 in ETUDES ET RECHERCHES DU GROUPE IN-
TERFACULTAIRE DES SCIENCES DU SPORT, UNWVERS1rt DE GENkVE, CHAPITREs C4oIsIs
Du DROrr DU SPORT 21 (1993).
9. Telephone Interview with Jonathan Fishbein, sports law consultant (Mar.
30, 1995). For a discussion of other problems related to the relationship between
the United States Figure Skating Association, the International Skating Union and
the Amateur Sports Act of 1978, see Jonathan S. Fishbein, When Sovereigns Collide:
Why America's Figure Skating Competitors are the Ultimate Losers Under the Amateur Sports
Act of 1978, 9 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 231 (1990).
10. See Lisa B. Bingham, Arbitration of Disputes for the Olympic Games: A Proce-
dure That Works, ARB. J., Dec. 1992, at 33.
11. Karen Rosen and Andy Miller, IOC Drafting Wording Requiring Athletes to
Stay Out of U.S. Courts, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Sept. 26, 1995, at 5E.
12. Id. See And the Winner Is... Arbitrators to Resolve Disputes as they Arise at
Olympics, A.B.A. J., Apr. 1996, at 20 (noting that 1996 summer games in Atlanta,
Georgia, will have arbitrators on scene for quick and final determinations). See also
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Within this regime of control, the Court of Arbitration for
Sport (CAS) is gradually becoming the preferred forum for resolv-
ing disputes between athletes, sports bodies and federations.13 Ac-
cordingly, athletes must agree to bring their disputes before the
CAS or face expulsion from competitions sanctioned by the IF in
their respective sports.
The development of the CAS and more informal methods for
resolving disputes in the sports arena has, however, coincided with
a somewhat greater, though still modest, use of the courts to resolve
disputes. Athletes have brought claims in both national courts and
regional courts, as in the Bosman case.14 The widespread adoption
of terminal arbitration clauses in licensing contracts, as well as im-
proved methods of more informal resolution of disputes, have not
inhibited litigation altogether. Litigation has not declined partly
because of the substantial increase in the number of professional or
semi-professional athletes and partly because many financially-re-
lated claims are beyond the competence of administrative proce-
dures and informal tribunals. These claims typically involve
fundamental human rights. Thus, courts have been willing to con-
sider a professional athlete's "right to work," the right to be heard
in formal proceedings and the right to be free of bias in those
proceedings.
The precise scope of this judicial review is uncertain. Domestic
courts and other authorities normally enforce CAS awards and
therefore refuse to conduct hearings de novo in matters that have
already been arbitrated. But there are exceptions, for example,
when an award contravenes a fundamental public interest or when
issues are raised about the jurisdiction of the CAS, its competence
to decide a given matter or fundamental irregularities in arbitral
procedures. In Gasser v. Stinson,15 for example, the English High
Court hinted at a restraint-of-trade exception to the normal re-
quirement that domestic courts must recognize and enforce other-
wise valid arbitral awards. 16 Although the High Court denied relief
to an athlete who had been suspended from competition after test-
13. Mack, supra note 8, at 687. The 1OC established the CAS in 1983 for "the
purpose of facilitating the settlement of disputes of a private nature arising out of
the practice or development of sport, and, in a general way, all activities pertaining
to sport." Id. (quoting STATUTE OF THE COURT OF ARBITRATION FOR SPORT, art. 1
(as amended 1990)).
14. Union Royale Belge des Societes de Football Ass'n ASBL & Ors v. Bos-
man, (Case C-415/93) [1995] 1 CEC 38.
15. Queen's Bench (June 15, 1988) (LEXIS, Intlaw Library, UK-CASE file).
16. Id. See also Nagle v. Feilden, [1966] 1 All E.R. 689, 693 (association should
not be able arbitrarily to deny license excluding person from trade or profession).
[Vol. III: p. 413
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ing positive for banned substances, the opinion suggests that if an
arbitral award deprives an athlete of his or her livelihood, the rea-
sonableness of the award may be reviewable by a court.17
English courts, whose decisions I will highlight, have been par-
ticularly helpful in defining parameters of judicial review.18 Nor-
mally, judicial review is very limited. Judges have often refused to
review the decisions of private or "domestic" tribunals, such as re-
view panels within sports organizations. 19 In the words of one
court, the rules of approved sports organizations are said to be
"more than a contract. They are a legislative code laid down by the
council of the union to be obeyed by the members." 20 English
courts do, however, accept jurisdiction whenever a plaintiff has
been denied an appropriate hearing or has been confronted with
bias; whenever a sports organization has exercised a monopolistic
position over its members; and whenever a sports organization's ad-
ministrative tribunal exercises public law functions, its decision
would violate statutory law or would have other public law
consequences. 21
The Bosman decision of the European Court of Justice, binding
in the United Kingdom and other European countries, is a recent
example of the latter principle at the level of regional law. In addi-
tion to the Gasser case, two English court opinions have been partic-
ularly significant because they disclose a modest trend away from
the application of national law to govern the decisions of sports
bodies. 22 It must be acknowledged, of course, that two opinions
17. Gasser, Queen's Bench (June 15, 1988) (LEXIS, Indaw Library, UK-CASE
file).
18. For further discussion of the English jurisprudence, see James Nafziger,
International Sports Law as a Process for Resolving Disputes, 45 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 130,
145 (1996).
19. Id,
20. Breen v. AEU, [1971] 1 All E.R. 1148, 1154. See also McInnes v. Onslow
Fane, [1978] 3 All E.R. 211, 223 (courts are reluctant to review decisions of private
sports bodies "even where those bodies are concerned with the means of livelihood
of those who take part in those activities"); Law v. National Greyhound Racing
Club Ltd., [1983] 1 W.L.R. 1302, 1307 (courts refuse to review decisions of domes-
tic tribunals). Thus, judicial review in the United Kingdom seems to extend at
least to cases involving clearly monopolistic practices in restraint of trade or to
those involving discrimination contrary to the fundamental human rights of
athletes.
21. See Nafziger, supra note 18.
22. For a discussion of the case law, see EDWARD GRAYSON, SPORT AND THE LAW
(1988). This book identifies the general reluctance of courts to undertake judicial
review while fully acknowledging their role in promoting the public interest and
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alone cannot establish anything more than a modest and perhaps
reversible trend.
In the first of these cases, Greig v. Insole,23 the Chancery Divi-
sion of the High Court of Justice assumed jurisdiction to hear a
dispute brought by several professional cricketers against two sports
associations, the International Cricket Conference (ICC) and its
English member, the Test and County Cricket Board (TCCB).24
The court held that the two associations had tortiously injured the
players by unlawfully attempting to induce a breach of their lucra-
tive contracts with a sports promotional organization, the World Se-
ries of Cricket.2 5 The court also held that both associations had
engaged in unreasonable, ultra vires restraints of trade by retroac-
tively barring the players' eligibility for international competition.2 6
It is important to note that the court's rationale for applying na-
tional law was very narrow. It limited judicial review of the deci-
sions of the two sports associations only because neither of them
was the ordinary kind of employers' association entitled to statutory
immunity under English law.2 7 Rather, the ICC was composed of
member countries, not individuals who might be deemed to be em-
ployees, and the TCCB had no power to regulate relations with
member athletes. 28 Hence, their decisions were reviewable under
English law only under these particular circumstances.2 9
In the second case, Cowley v. Heatley,30 the court interpreted a
national domicile requirement imposed on all athletes under the
Commonwealth Games Constitution.Sl In doing so, however, the
court questioned its jurisdiction to review a decision by the Com-
monwealth Games Federation (CGF) that had denied eligibility to a
swimmer.32 The South African plaintiff, Annette Cowley, had re-
cently begun to reside in England and was nominated to represent
England in the Games.3 3 The Federation denied her eligibility as a
member of the English team on the basis that her "domicile" was
23. [1978] 3 All E.R. 449.
24. Id. at 511.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 510.
27. Id. at 508-09.
28. Greig, [1978] 3 All E.R. at 508-09.
29. Id. at 511.
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not in England.34 The plaintiff argued that she was domiciled there
under a legal definition which required her only to be currently
residing in England and to have the intent of remaining there. 35
The court concluded, however, that an ordinary meaning of the
term "domicile" applied, rather than the definition provided by the
English common law.3 6 Accordingly, she had not resided long
enough in England to be domiciled there for the purpose of estab-
lishing her eligibility to compete on the English team in the
Games.37
Of particular interest in Cowley was the court's observation that
the constitution of the Commonwealth Games covered a large
number of different nations in the Commonwealth with members
upholding many different systems of law.38 In those circumstances
it was the court's view that the articles of the constitution could not
be governed by the law of one constituent member country.3 9 The
opinion concluded with a famous observation that the "[sport will]
be better served if we do not have long-running litigation at regular
intervals instituted by people seeking to challenge the decision of
the regulating body."4°
Taken together, these opinions highlight the parameters of ju-
dicial review in the English courts. Greig v. Insole affirms only a very
limited judicial role in ensuring fair and proper organization and
administration of competition, particularly if it involves the liveli-
hood and contractual integrity of professional athletes. Cowley v.
Heatley continued a modest trend away from applying national law
to interpret the rules of private sports associations. The court also
extended another trend when it questioned its jurisdiction to hear
a complaint brought by an athlete against an international sports
organization, the Commonwealth Games Federation.
Thus, English courts caution judicial restraint in examining
sports-related issues.41 As a result, English sports organizations en-
34. Id.






40. Cowley, Chancery Div., The Times (July 24, 1986) (LEXIS, Intlaw library,
UK-Case File).
41. British courts . . .have normally limited judicial review to disputes
requiring them to interpret or enforce professional contracts or other-
wise protect a person's ability to earn a living. "Amateur" athletes, there-
fore, have generally lacked standing to challenge decisions by their sports
organizations. The courts have often refused to issue orders of certiorari
1996] 419
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joy substantial autonomy so long as they do not offend fundamental
public interests nor unjustifiably endanger the livelihood of ath-
letes. 42 After all, competition in the courtroom is a poor substitute
for competition in the sports arena.43
Courts in the United States also have been reluctant to find
either express or implied rights of action in challenges by individ-
ual athletes against sports associations and have generally deferred
to private processes for resolving disputes.44 Courts are particularly
to review the decisions of private or "domestic" tribunals, such as nongov-
ernmental review panels and other organizational mechanisms for dis-
pute resolution. Their rules are said to be "more than a contract: they
are a legislative code laid down to be obeyed by the members."
Significantly, this jurisdictional barrier has been overcome in several
cases: where a plaintiff was denied a right to respond to objections or was
confronted with bias; where a sports organization's administrative tribu-
nal was deemed to be exercising public law functions or its decision
would have had public law consequences; and where the relationship at
issue between the parties was an amateur contract not governed by orga-
nizational rules. A final exception involves parties in a monopolistic posi-
tion, such as international and national federations. These exceptions
demonstrate a modest trend toward the judicial assumption of compe-
tence to review "public" issues or issues of procedural fairness.
James A.R. Nafziger, International Sports Law: A Replay of Characteristics and Trends,
86 AM. J. INT'L L. 489, 509 (1992) (citations omitted).
42. [T]he principal feature of English sport law appears to be the free-
dom enjoyed by sporting organizations to regulate the sport concerned,
provided that no right falling within an established legal category is vio-
lated. The interest of an individual in participation in sport does not so
fall. To the extent that such regulation is thus protected against effective
challenge in the ordinary courts, the state could be said to have been
captured by such bodies. Such capture might be thought simply to re-
flect judicial recognition of the fact that the essence of sporting activity
would be threatened by the transfer of sporting competition from the
stadium to the courtroom.... There is no apparent reason why public
interest considerations should not equally well be invoked to justify the
overruling of restrictions imposed on individual participation by a sport-
ing organization.
Andrew C. Evans, English Law of Sport, in AUF DEM WEGE Zu EINEM EUROPAISCHEN
SPoRTREcHT? 91, 95 (Michael R. Will ed., 1989).
43. McInnes v. Onslow Fane, [1978] 3 All E.R. 211. The court observed that:
courts must be slow to allow any implied obligation to be fair to be used
as a means of bringing before the court for review honest decisions of
bodies exercising jurisdiction over sporting and other activities which
those bodies are far better fitted to judge than the courts .... The con-
cepts of natural justice and the duty to be fair must not be allowed to
discredit themselves by making unreasonable requirements and imposing
undue burdens.
Id. at 223.
44. For example, "[the courts have been asked on several occasions to rule
on Olympic eligibility questions. Generally, the courts have left these matters to
the Olympic federations and their own procedures to resolve." RAY YASSER ET AL.,
SPORTS LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 93 (2d ed. 1994) (citing Gault v. United States
Bobsled and Skeleton Fed'n, 578 N.Y.S.2d 683 (App. Div. 1992)).
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loath to intervene in disciplinary hearings by private associa-
tions.45
Interpretations of the broadly worded provisions of the United
States Constitution are often controlling. Courts ordinarily refuse
to overrule the decisions of sports associations because these deci-
sions do not involve the requisite "state action" that would subject
them to constitutional scrutiny. Neither the Amateur Sports Act of
1978 nor any other federal law gives athletes a right to compete or a
cause of action in the courts. 4 6 Courts have, however, become
more willing to consider issues of procedural fairness.
On the other hand, the United States Constitution explicitly
provides for legislative protection of intellectual property rights. 4 7
Consequently, courts normally review claims involving trademarks
and other intellectual property rights, especially when these are
held by Olympic or Pan-American organizations to which the Ama-
teur Sports Act defers. For example, the United States Olympic
Committee's success in preserving its trademark rights is apparent
in a line ofjudicial decisions. 48 In San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc.
v. USOC,49 the United States Supreme Court enjoined an organiza-
45. The courts should rightly hesitate before intervening in disciplinary
hearings held by private associations.. . . Intervention is appropriate
only in the most extraordinary circumstances, where the association has
clearly breached its own rules, that breach will imminently result in serious
and irreparable harm to the plaintiff, and the plaintiff has exhausted all
internal remedies. Even then, injunctive relief is limited to correcting the
breach of the rules. The court should not intervene in the merits of the
underlying dispute.
Harding v. United States Figure Skating Ass'n, 851 F. Supp. 1476, 1479 (D. Or.
1994) (dictum). See also Hollis, supra note 6, at 196-97 (discussing role of Ameri-
can courts in implementing international sports law).
46. See Behagen v. Amateur Basketball Ass'n, 884 F.2d 524 (10th Cir. 1989);
Oldfield v. The Athletic Congress, 779 F.2d 505 (9th Cir. 1985); Michels v. United
States Olympic Comm., 741 F.2d 155 (7th Cir. 1984); DeFrantz v. USOC, 492 F.
Supp. 1181 (D.D.C. 1980); Dolan v. United States Equestrian Team, 608 A.2d 434
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1992).
47. Article I, § 8 of the Constitution provides that "[tihe Congress shall have
power ... [tio promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing, for
limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writ-
ings and discoveries." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. Congress has implemented this pro-
vision in various laws to protect trademarks, patents and copyrights.
48. See San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Comm.,
483 U.S. 522 (1987); United States Olympic Comm. v. Intelicense, 737 F.2d 263
(2d Cir. 1984); International Sports Mktg., Inc. v. International Olympic Comm. &
United States Olympic Comm., No. 83-44 (D. Vt. 1983); United States Olympic
Comm. v. Union Sport Apparel, 220 U.S.P.Q. 526 (E.D. Va. 1983); United States
Olympic Comm. v. International Fed. of Bodybuilders, 219 U.S.P.Q. 353 (D.D.C.
1982); United States Olympic Comm. v. David Shoe Co., Inc., No. C-1-82-596 (S.D.
Ohio 1982); Stop the Olympic Prison v. United States Olympic Comm., 489 F.
Supp. 1112 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
49. 483 U.S. 522 (1987).
1996]
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tion from applying the name "Olympic" in sports competition with-
out the USOC's consent.50 In another of the cases, USOC v.
Intelicense,51 the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-
cuit enjoined a Swiss corporation from marketing the five-ring
Olympic emblem in the United States without the USOC's consent,
after the IOC had required the corporation to obtain that con-
sent.52 The court interpreted the Amateur Sports Act 53 to provide
the USOC with remedies under the Trademark Act.54
A fundamental policy consideration in support of the court's
injunction in the Intelicense case was the importance of marketing
revenue to the USOC.55 Unlike the practice in many other coun-
tries, the USOC no longer receives direct governmental contribu-
tions.56 Instead, it must rely on commercial sources of revenue
such as royalties from intellectual property rights in order to help
finance the participation of United States athletes in the Olympic
Movement.57
In sum, with the exception of enforcing public law, such as
protections of intellectual property rights, English and American
courts are similarly reluctant to interfere with the decisions of
sports associations. In the United States this is true despite legisla-
tion that authorizes an official designation of sports bodies within
the Olympic Movement. Ultimately, what may distinguish some of
the specific details of the American experience from the English
experience is the strong role of the United States Constitution in
judicial analysis.
50. Id. at 530. The Court concluded that the language and legislative history
of the Amateur Sports Act indicated that Congress clearly intended to grant the
USOC exclusive use of the word "Olympic." Id.
51. 737 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1984).
52. Id. at 264.
53. 36 U.S.C. §§ 371-396 (1988).
54. United States Olympic Comm. v. Intelicense, 737 F.2d 263, 267 (2d Cir.
1984) (citing 15 U.S.C. §§ 1116-1118 (1983)). See generally Stephen B. Hay, Com-
ment, Guarding the Olympic Gold: Protecting the Marketability of Olympic Trademarks
through Section 110 of the Amateur Sports Act of 1978, 16 Sw. U. L. REv. 461 (1986)
(noting USOC use of 36 U.S.C. § 380 to protect trademarks).
55. Intelicense, 737 F.2d at 266. The USOC needed exclusive rights to market
the Olympic symbol in order to maintain high levels of corporate sponsorship. Id.
at 266 n.3.
56. Id. at 266.
57. Id. Further, the court noted that the United States, in view of the Ama-
teur Sports Act of 1978, had "cast the lone dissenting vote against a treaty that was
to give the IOC worldwide control over the use of the Olympic symbol." Id. at 268.
[Vol. III: p. 413
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